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questions asked by a trial court is a closer issue, as indicated by the dissent in
People v. Meandes. It is often a necessary and proper function of a trial judge
to take part in the examination of a witness to elicit significant facts, to clarify
issues or to facilitate the orderly progress of the trial5 0 But the trial judge must
refrain from asking questions in such a way as to disclose his opinion on the
merits or indicating a doubt on his part as to credibility of witnessess. 5 ' Under
section 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a trial judge may not decline to
answer jury's request for further instructions, but not every failure to answer
jury's questions constitutes reversible error.5 2 It is only where the court fails to
give information requested on a vital point, or where the failure to answer does
substantial harm to the defendant, that an appellate court may not disregard the
53
error.
Coram Nobis
The writ of error coram nobis will be granted upon a showing that a conviction was obtained by coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, or in any situation where
the defendant has been convicted without a preservation of his constitutional
rights, and this does not appear on the record.54 It is also a proper remedy to void
a conviction where it is established that the defendant had been mentally incompetent at the time of his arraignment.55 In People v. Sullivan,56 People v.
Smyth, 5 7 People v. Silvermant 8 and People v. Shapiro,5 the Court of Appeals
added both clarity and confusion to the problems surrounding the ancient writ.
In People v. Sullivan,60 defendant contended that the failure of the trial clerk
to ask him, after his plea of guilty, whether he had legal cause to show why judgment should not be rendered, was such a denal of due process as to permit use
of the writ of error coram nobis. 6' The Court denied this claim, and declared that
50. People v. Ohanian, 245 N.Y. 227, 157 N.E. 94 (1927.)
51. People v. Mulvey, 1 A.D.2d 541, 151 N.Y.S.2d 587 (4th Dep't 1956);
People v. Pecoraro, 177 App. Div. 803, 164 N.Y. Supp. 1058 (2d Dep't 1917); People
v. Kachadourian, 116 N.Y.S.2d 486 (County Ct. 1952).
52. People v. Gezzo, 307 N.Y. 385, 121 N.E.2d 380 (1954); People v. Lay, 279
N.Y. 737, 18 N.E.2d 686 (1938).
53. People v. Gonzales, 293 N.Y. 259, 56 N.E.2d 574 (1944); People v.
Shapiro, 285 N.Y. 581. 33 N.E.2d 250 (1941); People v. Wilkie, 286 App. Div. 835,
142 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1st Dep't 1955).
54. People v. Sadness, 300 N.Y. 69, 89 N.E.2d 188 (1949). See I BUFFALO L.
REV. 272 (1952) for a good discussion of the history of the writ of coram nobis
in New York.
55. People v. Boehm, 309 N.Y. 362, 368, 130 N.E.2d 897, 900 (1955).
56. 3 N.Y.2d 196, 165 N.Y.S.2d 6 (1957).
57. 3 N.Y.2d 184, 165 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1957).
58. 3 N.Y.2d 200, 165 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1957).
59. 3 N.Y.2d 203, 165 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1957).

60. See note 56, supra.

61. Defendant relied upon section 480 of the

CODE OF CVIMINAL PROCzDUnE

which declares:
When the defendant appears for judgment, he must be

asked by the clerk whether he has any legal cause to show
why judgment should not be pronounced.
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where only "the validity of the sentence is in question, the defendant is limited" to other forms of appeal. In reaching its result, it stated that, before entertaining
a motion for a writ, it was first necessary to determine the nature of the underlying error, such as conviction through coercion, or fraud. 63 Second, and more
important, it viewed the writ itself as an emergency measure, a tool of the court
used in the exercise of discretion, when all other avenues of judicial relief were
closed to a defendant. To be successful, the defendant must satisfy the two criteria
formulated by the Court. Since the defendant in People v. Smyth"4 could not produce evidence of his mental incompetence at the time of arraignment, he could
not demand a writ by demonstrating that the nature of the error allowed for the
use of the writ.
Both of these standards were applied in People v. Shapiro,63 where the Court
affirmed an order denying a motion to vacate judgment through an. attempted use
of the writ, since errors of fact were apparent on the face of the record, and
another means of appeal was available, although not taken by counsel. 66 The
result in the People v. Silverman case was not so satisfying. There the contention
of the defendant that the trial court improperly assigned counsel to him, and
refused to grant counsel of his own choosing, was held to be error of such a nature
as to entitle him to a hearing on his motion. 6 Although the Court examined the
nature of the underlying error, and found for the defendant, it did not satisfy the
other criterion set forth in the Sullivan case; that it, the unavailability of any
other avenue of judicial relief by way of appeal, since the Court found the error to
be obvious and a regular appeal would lie.6 s Because a post-conviction remedy
was available, the writ should have been denied, even though the nature of the
error allowed for a use of the writ of error coram nobis.
If the Court in the Sullivan decision meant that a defendant need only meet
one of the criteria set forth, then the decisions are consistent. But, there was great
emphasis placed upon the extraordinary quality, the emergency use, of coram
nobis, and the need to meet that criterion along with the other relating to the
nature of the mistake. Even a desire to treat each case according to its own equities
can not satisfactorily explain the misapplication or non-application of the two
standards established in the Sullivan case. A contrary result in the case of People
v. Silverman would have established much sounder footing for future case problems
62. People v. Sullivan, 3 N.Y.2d 196, 198, 165 N.Y.S.2d 6, 9 (1957).

63. Id. at 198, 165 N.Y.S.2 at 9. For a discussion of the types of cases where
relief has been afforded, and which provide the basis for the narrow use of the
writ, see 1 BUFFALO L. REV. 274 (1952), and cases cited therein.
64. 3 N.Y.2d at 186, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 739.

65. See note 59 supra.

66. People v. Shapiro, 3 N.Y.2d 203, 204, 165 N.Y.S.2d 14, 15 (1957).
67. People v. Silverman, 3 N.Y.2d 200, 165 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1957).
68. Id. at 201, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 13.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
involving coram nobis where both the nature of the writ and its emergency application are brought into dispute.
Parole Violation
The Correction Law, section 219, provides that if any prisoner, who has
been paroled from a state prison commits and is convicted of a crime in another
state, which if committed in this state would be a felony, he shall upon his
return to this state be confined in prison to serve the remaining portion of the
maximum sentence from which he had been paroled.69 The Court held (4-3) in
People ex rel. Watkins v. Murphy,7 0 a habeas corpus proceeding, that section 218
of the Correction Law, 71 which provides that a parole board should declare a
prisoner to be delinquent whenever there is reasonable cause to believe he has
violated his parole, does not terminate the prisoner's parole so as to immunize him
from the penalty imposed by section 219.
The defendant, a parolee from a New York prison, had been declared
delinquent from such parole in accordance with section 218. A month later he
was arrested, convicted and sentenced to a term in a Texas prison for the
commission of a crime, which all of the Court agreed would be a felony if
committed in this state. Upon being released from the Texas prison, he was
returned to New York to serve the remainder of the maximum sentence from
which he had originally been paroled.
When a prisoner is paroled, he is in fact being permitted to serve part of
his sentence outside of prison.7 2 As of the time he is declared delinquent from
this parole however, his sentence stops and the "time owed shall date from such
73
delinquency."
The dissenting judges upheld the defendant's contention that he did not
commit the crime while he was on parole for he had previously been declared
delinquent thereby terminating his parole. As soon as the parole is declared
delinquent, he assumes the status of an escaped convict.74 Therefore, since he
is no longer lawfully out of prison, he cannot be said to be a charge of the Board
of Parole;75 nor can he be said to be on parole within the meaning of section 219
if he is no longer on parole within the meaning of section 218.
The majority however views the parolee as a prisoner on parole and until
69. N.Y. COEMcTON LAw §219.
70. 3 N.Y.2d 163, 164 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1957).
71. N.Y. CORPEcTioN LAW §218.
72. People ex rel. Rainone v. Murphy, 1 N.Y.2d 367, 153 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1956).

73. N.Y. CORRECTION LAW §218.
74.
75.

Hutchings v. Mallon, 245 N.Y. 521, 157 N.E. 842 (1927).
Dote v. Martin, 294 N.Y. 330, 62 N.E.2d 217 (1945).

